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Special Collection - Locative Media
to every being as such there belongs identity, the unity within 
itself.
—Heidegger (1957/1969, p. 26)
Some time ago, a colleague and I engaged in an inspired 
exchange over how to best situate the concept of identity in 
the era of widespread mobile social media use. Our criti-
cisms centered on how identity was too often discussed in 
terms of its position within a system of exchanges, how it is 
affixed with various properties, or as something abstracted 
from day to day living (this is especially true of social media 
identities, which have too often been viewed as disembod-
ied; see Moores, 2012). For my colleague and me, these 
approaches seemed stagnant and lacked something funda-
mental. It was not until I stumbled upon Heidegger’s 
(1957/1969) The Principle of Identity that a solution to our 
concerns presented itself.
In this published lecture, Heidegger proclaims that identity 
is belonging together. When uttering this phrase, emphasis 
ought to be placed on the word belonging rather than together. 
Heidegger proposes that by stressing the former rather than the 
latter, one is better able to jettison thinking that positions 
identity as a fundamental trait of Being, the traditional view of 
identity held by metaphysics (Stambaugh, 1969, pp. 12-13). 
Heidegger suggested for us to revisit the pre-Socratic philoso-
phers, namely, Parmenides, to demonstrate that our attempt to 
understand identity with a metaphysically laden approach was 
an erroneous path to embark upon. Rather than consider iden-
tity as a facet of one’s existence—something a person, upon 
reflection, declares allegiance to or lays claim over as one uni-
fies the self with socially defined traits through performative 
actions (I have the identity of a student because I attend uni-
versity)—Heidegger’s statement encourages us to realize 
identity as a claim speaking from the Being of beings. 
Heidegger’s entire philosophical project advocates that a 
human being’s essentiality lies in his or her ability to remain 
open to being’s claim and respond to it; “man is essentially this 
relationship of responding to being, and he is only this . . . a 
belonging to Being prevails within man, a belonging which 
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Abstract
In the forward of Heidegger’s Identity and Difference, Joan Stambaugh proposes that in his statement “identity is belonging 
together,” the emphasis ought to be placed on the word belonging. By emphasizing belonging rather than together, one 
is better able to jettison thinking that centers identity as a fundamental trait of Being, the traditional view of identity held 
by metaphysics. This article will explicate this idea by drawing from a series of unstructured interviews conducted with 
young people in Athens during the 2015 July 5th Greek Referendum. This article argues that with attention devoted to the 
practice of skillful coping, the essence of identity, rather than a reflective cognitive undertaking, correlates to what Heidegger 
refers to as the event of appropriation. When finding the self affected by the world, what becomes revealed is an intimate 
identification with the world and things within it as it unfolds. With mobile media technologies, we are privileged to witness 
a particular way of being affected by the world, one where material and immaterial locations (such as social media arenas) 
converge together and whose perceptual distinctions become inseparable. Subsequently, we can also witness how the act 
of skillful coping, the motivated relationship between the body and the object, stands as the principal site where engulfment 
and investment become unconcealed.
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listens to being because it is appropriated to being” (Heidegger, 
1957/1969, p. 31).
Drawing from Heideggerian scholar Hubert Dreyfus, it is 
my assertion that our appropriation to being manifests itself 
with the most clarity when we find ourselves invested in and 
involved with the things that populate our immediate sur-
roundings, when we find ourselves engulfed in our daily 
doings. Thus, to make sense of identity, as belonging together 
with being, we must remain attentive to skillful coping, 
defined by Heidegger (1927/1962) as that “kind of concern 
which manipulates things and puts them to use” (p. 95). 
Skillful coping is indicative of both engulfment into and 
investment with the world, as evidenced by how objects 
become revealed as both available and ready-to-hand-for-
the-sake-of-which. This distinction is meant “to indicate the 
mostly smooth and unobtrusive responsiveness to circum-
stances that enable human beings to get around in the world” 
(Rouse, 2000, p. 8; see also Dreyfus, 2015). Upon reflection, 
when taking objects and putting them to use, one finds the 
self temporarily taken and affected by the unveiling world in 
that the person, the object, and the world seemed to have 
temporarily fostered a harmonious unity.
This piece will show that with attention devoted to the 
practice of skillful coping, the essence of identity, rather than 
a reflective cognitive undertaking, belongs to what Heidegger 
(1957/1969) refers to as the event of appropriation (p. 39). 
When finding the self affected by the world, what becomes 
revealed is an intimate identification with the world itself 
and the things within it as it unfolds through interaction. 
With our use of mobile media technologies, we are privi-
leged to witness a particular way of being affected by the 
world, one where our being-in-place involves our material 
situatedness intertwining with immaterial locations (such as 
social media arenas). As these locations converge within our 
phenomenological horizon via the engagement with one’s 
mobile, their perceptual distinctions become nearly insepa-
rable. Through this event (Ereignis), we can thus witness 
how the act of skillful coping, the motivated relationship 
between the body and the object, stands as the principal site 
where our engulfment and investment become apparent. This 
idea will be explicated by drawing from a series of unstruc-
tured interviews conducted with young people in Athens dur-
ing the 2015 July 5th Greek Referendum.
In the summer of 2015, I took an impromptu trip to Greece 
to spend some time with a close friend. While there, Tsipras 
called for a referendum on the conditions of the European 
Union’s proposed financial package. Throughout the city, 
people could be heard debating about which avenue presented 
the best path forward. Although this trip was intended as a 
holiday, I felt that speaking with individuals during such a 
tumultuous period would allow me to gain some insight into 
the crisis. While walking with a friend through an assortment 
of Athenian boroughs, I asked people at random to discuss 
their experience of the crisis, how they acquired information 
about it, and finally their personal ways of coping with it. 
Because these interviews were improvisationally conducted, 
they tended to adopt a semistructured approach (van Manen, 
2016) and, at times, exhibited traits more fitting of a conver-
sation. To draw from Merleau-Ponty (1962/2002, p. vii), I 
encouraged the participants to abandon abstract generaliza-
tions and causality, and instead offer direct descriptions of 
their experience, both as it happened in real time and via per-
sonal reflection. They were asked to consider themselves in 
the context of the there, of themselves as individuals being-
in-place. By situating these individuals as Daseins,1 we could 
better emphasize the immediacy of how they were experienc-
ing that brief period, specifically to showcase how they found 
themselves uniquely involved in the crisis as they lived it. 
Specifically, my objective was to find commonalities between 
the individuals as it pertained to their mobile social media 
engagement as a prereflective response to the crisis. The fol-
lowing paragraph consists of general information gleaned 
from these conversations.
Because Tsipras’s referendum sprung up so quickly, those 
spoken with explained that they were detrimentally unaware 
about what exactly was at stake. People immediately took to 
their mobile to find and discuss information concerning the 
country’s economic instability and its possible Grexit. 
Although negotiations had been tense for months, until now 
never did any of the interviewees feel that Greece was in dan-
ger of being removed from the Eurozone. The potential for 
such an immediate shift in stability encouraged the utilization 
of the mobile as a tool to access a plethora of news outlets 
from both Greece (Athens Voice) and abroad (Le Monde in 
France, CNN or VICE in the United States, and the BBC or 
The Guardian in the United Kingdom). Social networks were 
another principal source to mine information. Facebook, in 
particular, was described as a dependable source because the 
discussions taking place were all from people known to the 
viewer. People were curious to know the opinions of those 
within their social circle, both close friends and distant 
acquaintances. One interviewee, named Eirini K. (personal 
communication, June-July, 2015), suggested that Facebook 
was an insightful avenue for information acquisition because 
of the diversity of shared articles and because it permitted the 
gauging of what people thought in the form of comments. 
Depending on the diversity of one’s friend group, one could 
see which side tended to accumulate the most support. After 
speaking to a number of people, it appeared that each would 
recursively turn to the mobile as the primary means to combat 
any confusion. This tiny instrument had gradually become 
their device of choice due to how their skillful engagement 
with it, the everyday tapping and swiping that accompanies 
this technology, fostered a portal-like opening that subse-
quently seemed to produce sense of community and a harmo-
nious unity between the self and the world.
The tapping and swiping one does on mobile media tech-
nologies, similar to hammering a nail or stirring with a spoon, 
can be considered a form of skillful coping. We usually over-
look such actions because they seem mundane, simple, and 
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routine to us. Moreover, they tend to be performed without 
cognitive contemplation. When questioned how we execute 
particular undertakings such as using an array of cooking 
utensils in a kitchen to prepare a dish, we often cannot ade-
quately describe how we move with such confidence. As 
someone who cooks quite frequently, even I have difficultly 
explaining how I know the precise amount of a particular 
ingredient to add, the duration necessary to let something sit, 
or which of my utensils is best suited to stir sauce. As we 
confidently perform our tasks, we seem to know what is 
required. If the user is skilled enough in the sense that the user 
has experience with such matters, cognitive thought is rarely 
relied upon; rather, the user simply takes the object, molds 
with it, and puts it to use in ways that are specifically relevant. 
The individual is suddenly caught up in a flow of invested 
activity. What we are privileged to see with this phenomenon 
is that when inhabiting an world and encountering things with 
a phenomenal body, “they become the preliminary theme for 
a preview of a ‘knowing’ which, phenomenologically, looks 
towards Being . . . [they] are simply what gets used, what gets 
produced, and so forth” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 95).
Skillfully interacting with objects equally affords us the 
opportunity to engage with their thingly qualities. The term 
thing holds much significance for Heidegger; he proclaims 
that the word’s original meaning best translates to what we 
call gathering (see Heidegger, 1971, pp. 163-180). Today, 
however, the word thing is too easily substituted with scien-
tifically infused words like entity or object. When thinking of 
the term exclusively with a scientific mind-set, Heidegger 
frets that we lose sight of a thing’s fundamental thingy nature. 
It is imperative to recognize that thingly qualities have noth-
ing to do with distinguishable properties, such as weight or 
color; instead, thingly qualities are meant to indicate the way 
that our interactions with a series of interrelated things per-
mit the unobtrusive unfolding of a world suitable for us to 
inhabit. A formal dinner party, a concert, a sporting event, or 
a political rally are examples by which one can witness this 
unfolding. To reference the Greeks specifically, when my 
interviewees were inspired to take their mobile media tech-
nologies and interact with others, their investment in the cri-
sis, their allegiance to being Greek, and their desire to 
participate with peers all seemed to intertwine through the 
mobile itself. A participant named Again Lydia K. (personal 
communication, June-July, 2015) remarked that although 
residing in Bulgaria, before coming home for the summer, 
she found herself feeling incredibly near to Greece and its 
troubles, a sentiment made possible in part because of her 
recursive, skillful utilization of the mobile. Following the 
instrument’s activation and unlocking, within a few short 
clicks, Greece, and the hectic commotions taking place there, 
ushered into her phenomenological horizon. She not only 
found herself virtually transported to Greece, à la John Urry’s 
mobilities paradigm (Urry, 2000, 2007), but equally experi-
enced a seamless intermeshing of the digital with her mate-
rial location, a fushion that provided the foundation for her 
felt closeness to Greece. We ought to be aware that Lydia 
cultivates and thus nurtures this smooth intertwining by 
using her iPhone to explore media publications, social media 
sites, or even to speak with her friends and family via appli-
cations such as iMessage and Facebook Messenger. This 
happening is best exemplified with the term poiēsis. Although 
translated nowadays as poetry, poiēsis should be equated 
with its original ancient Greek meaning, to make, albeit not 
in the sense of production, but rather as poetic cultivation.
When Heidegger revisited the pre-Socratics, he discov-
ered that this rendition of poiēsis was always correlated with 
phusis, a word the ancient Greeks used in place of the word 
being; “it was the name for the way the most real things in 
the world present themselves to us” (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2011, 
p. 200). Instrumental to the pre-Socratic use of phusis is that 
the word
names the sense of Being as such and not merely one specific 
mode of being, or a part of the whole as it was for Plato and 
Aristotle. This Pre-Socratic notion of phusis moreover contains 
an intrinsic absencing dimension which, therefore, is not 
reducible to pure presence. (DiPippo, 2000, p. 17)
This understanding of phusis is best demonstrated with the 
Heraclitus phrase, Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεί (nature loves to 
hide itself). As explained in Tao Ruspoli’s (2010) Being in 
the World, for the Homeric Greeks, to be (as phusis) was to 
manifest out into the open via a temporal emergence or blos-
soming. This coming into presence would, inevitably, wither 
way and fade from one’s phenomenological horizon. The 
presence of phusis in our lives today can be viewed, for 
example, via one’s emotional expressions or a triumphant 
athletic performance. Hubert Dreyfus often refers to these 
phenomena as a whooshing up, moments where an individ-
ual person becomes so attuned to the particular mood or aura 
of their surroundings that they become compelled to respond 
in a specific way. In plain speak, following such a response, 
one might proclaim that they seemed to have temporarily lost 
control or were taken by an indescribable force.
To associate poiēsis and phusis with identity, consider 
how instrumental a truly engaged person’s methodical pro-
gressions are for permitting the world to continuously pres-
ence itself not only as inhabitable but also as the site for an 
array of possible pathways to embark upon. Consider, for 
instance, the way the American transcendentalist Henry 
David Thoreau describes his mission to confront what he 
designates as the essential facts of life by secluding himself 
in the woods outside of Concord, Massachusetts (see 
Thoreau, 1964). Thoreau sought to adopt a very specific atti-
tude during his time there, one where he could acquire an 
acute awareness of and attentiveness to the various manifes-
tations that emerged because of his being-there with Walden 
Pond. Thoreau, to use Heidegger’s terms, attempted to 
become a master of his mood, to account for and contemplate 
the unique way that the world manifested itself to him (see 
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Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 175). Mood, or Stimmung, is 
Heidegger’s method to illustrate Dasein’s specific ways of 
finding itself attuned to the world—“ways of finding things 
that matter” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 169). Each day when ventur-
ing out into the territory surrounding Walden Pond, Thoreau 
found himself not just noticing various alterations with more 
lucidity, but increasingly being captivated by them. Thoreau 
often described with remarkable clarity moments where he 
was taken or seized by specific unfoldings, thus demonstrat-
ing a temporal attunement to the tiny developments that 
accompanied spring’s arrival. Instead of being isolated enti-
ties abstracted from one another, the melting snow, flourish-
ing vegetation, and animals emerging from hibernation 
clearly took on newfound value.
As Thoreau found himself meaningfully engaging with 
the things that surrounded him, he experienced taking part in 
a cocreative phenomenon where he felt a unique identifica-
tion with the world’s offerings. He noticed the subtle differ-
ences each day and came to further appreciate how they 
collectively contributed not only to the emergence of spring 
but also to how he identified with them and with the rejuvi-
nating power of spring as a whole. In essence, he accepted 
Periander’s advice, μελέτη τό πãν (take into care beings as a 
whole; see Heidegger, 1981/1993, p. 3). Take note of how he 
keenly elaborated on how his attitude and general disposition 
underwent a sweeping alteration at the first sight of spring’s 
arrival, and how he found himself attuned with the world in 
a perfect congruent unity:
At length the sun’s rays have attained the right angle, and warm 
winds blow up mist and rain and melt the snow banks, and the 
sun dispersing the mist smiles on a checkered landscape of 
russet and white smoking with incense, though the traveler picks 
his way from islet to islet, cheered by the music of a thousand 
tinkling rills and rivulets whose veins are filled with the blood of 
winter which they are bearing off. Few phenomena gave me 
more delight than to observe the forms which thawing sand and 
clay assuming in flowing down the sides of a deep cut on the 
railroad through which I passed on my way to the village. 
(Thoreau, 1964, p. 544)
It is important to remember that Thoreau was not simply 
observing the unfolding world, but because of his specific 
investment with it and responses to it, was actively working 
to draw it out. In speaking on Thoreau’s experience, Richard 
Gray (2011) writes,
The annual resurrection of nature figures the possible 
resurrection of human nature, his and ours. It is not just a figure, 
however: the rhythms of seasonal renewal ground the rhythms 
of spiritual renewal, they supply a resource and correspondence 
for the soul. (p. 65)
As the vegetation returned from its dormant state, it became 
an integral component for the emergence of spring and the 
transformation of Thoreau’s mood, one significantly different 
from what showed itself in winter. Thoreau’s reflections indi-
cate his world seemed to take on a particularly distinct quality 
as the things around him began to look and feel different. As 
the ushering in of spring coincided with winter’s withdrawal, 
Thoreau’s fading doldrums speak to how
self-hiding belongs to the predilection of Being. And the essence 
of Being is to conceal itself, to emerge, to come out of the 
unhidden. Only what in its essence unconceals and must 
unconceal itself can love to conceal itself. Only what is 
unconcealing can be concealing. (Heidegger, 1998, pp. 
229-230)
In this instance, what occurred was the materialization of 
meaning independent of Thoreau, meaning that he as a per-
ceiving entity was not a sole provider of, à la the Cartesian 
tradition. Rather Thoreau sensed and cultivated meaning 
through his active engagement with a collection of interre-
lated things situated in place, in the nature that surrounded 
his modest cabin. In cultivating and nurturing his identifica-
tion with the unfolding world, Thoreau is, to use Heidegger’s 
own phrase, delivered over to being—his being appropriated 
by it. Amid these experiences, we must remember that 
Thoreau’s evident conviviality is not explicitly governed by 
his own subjectivity in that he did not directly assign mean-
ing to it as it occurred. In hindsight, however? Yes. 
Reflectively, Thoreau did categorize and proclaim things to 
be, typically in ontic terms. When reflecting on the walk and 
the collectivity experienced, Thoreau could and often did 
categorize it in its parts. By now, one should know that this is 
not how he experienced things! Rather, the felt understand-
ings emerged because of his innate receptivity to meaning 
that he was capable of sensing and thus cultivating through 
involved interaction.
Should we nonchalantly belittle Thoreau’s heightened 
sense of awareness of the objects around his walking path as 
the by-product of habit, we will do him a disservice. We 
should rather be aware that his ability to detect changes is an 
indication of a willingness to be affected and drawn into 
action alongside things. As Dreyfus and Kelly (2011) sug-
gest, “the achievement of skill involves more than the mere 
acquisition of a physical ability. Learning a skill is learning 
to see the world differently” (p. 207). For Heidegger, this is 
the work poets perform:
The artist or poet cannot do his work in any normal human way, 
in any way that already presupposes the world that he is to set 
up. He must be something like the vehicle of an impersonal 
force—art or truth or being itself. The artist must be “resolute,” 
entschlossen, ecstatically “opened up” to this force. (Inwood, 
1997, p. 127)
While Thoreau is not a poet in a strictly traditional sense, 
it is evident that he is absorbed in the practice of poetic activ-
ity in that he possesses the capacity to remain open to mani-
festations and, by consequence, being’s embrace;
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the idea that there is something there independently of me is 
something you have to cultivate and develop a sensitivity to, and 
. . . that is what a poet does. The poet is sort of the paradigmatic 
instance of the person who’s learned a receptivity to things 
independent of us. (Thompson, 2010)
Instead of progressing along the path toward town with indif-
ference, Thoreau’s willingness to remain open to being 
affected allowed him to respond quite specifically to mean-
ing independent of him and, moreover, actively cultivate 
being (phusis) through poetic engagement (poiēsis). In our 
modern age, one vastly more complex than Thoreau’s, we 
are tasked with allowing skillful coping to deliver us over, to 
experience being’s claim on us, and thus respond accord-
ingly. Heidegger’s own advice is that “we must experience 
simply this owning in which man and being are delivered 
over to each other, that is, we must enter into what we call the 
event of appropriation” (Heidegger, 1957/1969, p. 36).
By this point, it is fair to question how this philosophical 
chatter relates to locative mobile media use and the Greek 
Referendum. Before proceeding, it would be fruitful to pro-
vide a hypothesis about the relationship between technology 
and human beings in the modern technological epoch. As 
Ling (2012) insightfully shows us, mobile media technolo-
gies are now deeply embedded into the social fabric of most 
societies. Whether a person is an active participant is inconse-
quential because all people must deal with a world that has 
invited these technologies into the everyday social ecology. 
Because of such prevalence and omnipresent use, many peo-
ple have come to take these technologies for granted. Their 
presence goes practically unnoticed unless one is faced with 
an inoperable instrument. One reason we fail to notice their 
presence is because, gradually, we have incorporated them 
into what Kalaga (2010) refers to as the third of the body, the 
portion of the body which “occupies a place both overlapping 
and bracketing binaries” (p. 4). When a person encounters an 
instrument that they feel comfortable handling, the object 
undergoes a process of internalization and steadily loses the 
distinction of being an object all together, eventually molding 
with the body, a phenomenon made evident through Merleau-
Ponty’s example of the blind man’s cane; the stick “has ceased 
to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; 
its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the 
scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to 
sight” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/2002, p. 165).
Consider the different ways that these technologies are 
utilized in relation to the body: We willingly implant earbuds 
into our audial cavities, we take the mobile and strap it onto 
our arm to monitor various body-related measurements while 
exercising, and we employ applications to replace tangible 
objects like airline boarding passes, credit cards, and tradi-
tional cameras. When these technologies are viewed from a 
positive prospective, we phenomenologically project our 
future with them as though they were additional limbs. In 
fact, in previous work, I have associated a missing or broken 
mobile with the phantom limb phenomenon (Battin, 2016). 
When observing the phenomena of projection, people exhibit 
qualities of what David Seamon (1979) refers to as a feeling-
subject, an experiential stratum associated with attachment 
that is “a matrix of emotional intentionalities within the per-
son which extend outward in varying intensities to the cen-
ters, places, and spaces of a person’s everyday geographical 
world” (p. 76). A feeling-subject is driven by attraction and 
closeness to specific things encountered in the world. These 
examples, however, only speak to the mobile’s material 
dimensions. The most fascinating aspect about the mobile 
concerns the concept of interface; “when cyberspace 
becomes an extension of mental space, when one beings to 
think cyberspace, the tool changes into an interface” (Kalaga, 
2010, p. 17). In this specific era, we should be mindful of 
how multilayered our existence has become. Any consider-
ation of our lifeworld (Lebenswelt) ought to account for how 
mobile social media, as locations to be traversed, always in 
some way exist as possibilities within our experiential 
horizon.
Location is a concept that is markedly different from 
world, both spatially and temporally. Whereas world is 
defined by its encompassing and enduring character, location 
instead speaks to Dasein’s immediate reading of and respond-
ing to what populates that world. Conceiving location as an 
experientially derived point draws further emphasis to the 
unfolding of Dasein’s horizon, made evident with the use of 
the words here and yonder. Foundational to Dasein’s exis-
tence is that its understanding is derived from being appro-
priated by the immediacy of the there (the Da of Sein) and 
how that there allows Dasein to progress free from existen-
tial obstructions from its here toward the yonder (or towards-
which). Heidegger writes,
The “here” of an “I-here” is always understood in relation to a 
“yonder” ready-to-hand, in the sense of Being towards this 
“yonder”—a Being which is de-severant, directional, and 
concernful. Dasein’s existential spatiality, which thus determines 
its “location,” is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world. The 
“yonder” belongs definitely to something encountered within-
the-world. “Here” and “yonder” are possibly only in a “there.” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 171)
This very Heideggerian quote invites a particularly 
insightful reading, being that because Dasein is not closed 
off, in the sense that the world is open and made available to 
Dasein via forthcoming disclosures, Dasein is always driving 
forward, typically toward something that develops into a 
location through our invested activity. Reflect upon a ques-
tion raised in Building Dwelling Thinking (Heidegger, 
1954/1977). After asking what it is to dwell, Heidegger’s 
(1954/1977) second question becomes, “in what way does 
building belong to dwelling?” (p. 329). The answer, 
Heidegger proclaims, is that the act of building generates 
locations. The constructed Heidelberg Bridge creates 
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conjoined riverbanks that, now united by the bridge, come to 
take on new significance once traversed by inhabitants. The 
bridge and the riverbanks create implications for the worlds 
of the conjoined towns, their populaces, and their surround-
ing regions. Please note, also, that my use of location is not 
akin to place, a concept which tends to be associated with the 
nebulous and ambiguous characteristics that provide human 
inhabitants with a range of emotions and feelings like attach-
ment or repulsion (see also Cresswell, 2004; Malpas, 1999; 
Tuan, 1977).
In my view, mobile social media applications are also 
locations available for our traversing. Like the bridge in 
Heidelberg, they are built things that gather seemingly unre-
lated areas together. Whereas the riverbanks come to take on 
a new meaning due to the presence of the built bridge, the 
unknown whereabouts of others (friends, family members, 
etc.) come to take on increased relevance in how the applica-
tion draws them nearer. Moreover, like inhabitants departing 
Heidelberg who find themselves guided toward the bridge, 
mobile phone users may find themselves steered toward an 
application to engage with those on the other side. Each of 
these, mobile users and travelers from Heidelberg, move 
along with a state of mind that guides them toward their des-
tination. Because mobile media technologies allow us to 
draw immaterial locations nearer (social media arenas, news 
outlets, etc.), we are privileged to see how “the subject’s cor-
poreal experience and awareness reaches beyond the limits 
defined by physical boundaries” (Kalaga, 2010, p. 5). In 
other words, in the modern world, we now think in terms of 
interface; we are always already thinking beyond our own 
corporeality (see also Farman, 2012; de Souza e Silva, 2006). 
For instance, Lydia, the Greek residing in Bulgaria, ada-
mantly stated that Greece never felt far away because of an 
embodied awareness of her ability to access others within 
immaterial locations. By simply possessing a mobile, know-
ing its capacities and feeling its penetrating presence in her 
life, Lydia world now gathers in a very specific way, one that 
seems to provide confidence through the embodied under-
standing of her place within a communal world; she never 
felt isolated or alone.
Some individuals were, unsurprisingly, inspired enough 
to attend the rallies in Syntagma Square. To include those not 
permitted to attend (some parents felt that the event could be 
dangerous), individuals maintained an open line with others 
by uploading posts to Facebook and Twitter, predominantly 
in video and photo format. One interviewee named Nikolas 
P. (personal communication, June-July, 2015) proclaimed 
that the reason for sending out messages to absent others is 
because he found himself compelled to include them, to 
allow them a purview into the actions taking place on the 
ground. Nikolas’s description indicates how his identifica-
tion with the specific world at this particular junction fosters 
a welling up; he found himself overcome with an irresistible 
urge to provide an avenue for others to join in the emerging 
collective. The important aspect to remember is that people 
attending the rallies in the city center were not disinterest-
edly retrieving their mobiles and broadcasting for the mere 
sake of it. A combination of the unfolding scenario, their 
relationship to others, and an embodied allegiance to 
Greekness motivated their actions. Moreover, when Nikolas 
prereflectively retrieves his mobile to invite others into the 
mêlée, he reveals an intertwining of Heidegger’s here and 
yonder unique to this age. The mobile, as a modern artifact 
incorporated into the body’s third, acts as a locational portal 
bridging the here (material) and the yonder (immaterial). 
Influenced by those populating his immediate copresence, in 
addition to his present mood, Syntagma Square, as a geo-
graphical, spatial, and temporal scene, had come to take on 
greater significance for Nikolas and his world, thus encour-
aging him to respond accordingly.2 Somewhat like the 
Heidelberg Bridge, albeit with an immaterial dimension, his 
mobile media applications prove to be a distinct junction 
containing their own uses and values that contribute to the 
evolving character of that world. Finally, his experiences 
lend support to the notion that we still exist in an intimately 
and affectually bound mobile society, aptly exemplified with 
Weber’s reformulation of Tönnies’s notion of Gemeinschaft. 
In perpetually feeling others and being drawn to them, each 
stands opposite gesellschaft, a society defined by its imper-
sonal, obligatory ties. This awareness demonstrates the sort 
of conditioning by the world that we should remain attentive 
to, not simply for the sake of doing so, but because we are 
better capable of seeing how we identify with a world that 
existentially matters to us and how, in this era, we are always 
situated among others, regardless of physical proximity.
Somewhat similar to how Thoreau found himself caring 
and identifying with a world he himself helped cultivate, the 
Greek interviewees declared that they suddenly found them-
selves identifying with their nation, with Athens, with the 
country’s rich history, and most importantly with its ensured 
continuation. The general consensus from the interviewees is 
that Greece was under attack, as a nation, as a culture, and as 
a tradition. People even began to question whether Greece 
ought to be considered a European nation. The interviewees 
agreed that the future seemed decidedly murky. The mood 
permeating throughout the region, particularly within the 
Athens city center, is one that could be felt by each person. 
Its unavoidable presence lingered through crowded squares, 
quiet alleys, and half-empty cafes. Anywhere one traveled, 
one was faced with an intermixture of glaring uncertainty, 
outright frustration, and, in some instances, utter contempt 
for the European Union. According to Iris K. (personal com-
munication, June-July, 2015), one of the interviewees, each 
person was faced with the undeniable reality of needing the 
other. To successfully move beyond this crisis, the realiza-
tion of a rich community was necessary. Iris suggested that 
this understanding is the primary reason each individual 
recursively took to their mobiles. Although not necessarily 
clarified with dense terminology, the interviewees disclosed 
that their persistent retrieval of the mobile followed by the 
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tapping of buttons and icons were in fact skillful actions that 
encouraged the cultivation of social cohesion. By using the 
mobile and keeping it readily available, they all concurred 
that they suddenly felt more Greek. Their persistent retrieval 
of the mobile helped to temporarily establish a closer rela-
tionship to other Greeks and, consequently, a revival of their 
shared sense of Greekness. Actions like the typing of a com-
ment within an ongoing thread or scrolling down the screen 
to read an article seemed to bring the individual, the immate-
rial locale, and those that populate it closer together, particu-
larly when sharing the articles on social media to stimulate 
dialogue. Their prereflectively grabbing of the mobile to 
open a portal to others would not have been performed had 
they not become attuned to the world in a specific way.3 Like 
Thoreau in Walden Pond, the participants too found them-
selves affected by, responding to, and drawn into a world, 
albeit one uniquely Greek at this moment in time.
Being attentive to such marginal practices, while seem-
ingly insignificant if understood superficially, is important 
because, as Dreyfus and Kelly state,
The fact is, whether you know it or not, you already care about 
a whole range of goods. Just as the world is pregnant with 
meanings waiting to be revealed, human beings are filled with 
modes of caring that they have hidden from themselves. This 
may seem surprising. The idea that our cares exceed our 
understanding of them seems to be an affront to the fundamental 
principles of knowledge. Surely, if I can care about something 
than I am in a position to know I do. The Enlightenment tradition 
suggests such a principle, and contemporary philosophy takes it 
virtually as an article of faith. But to be an embodied being as we 
are, open to moods as meaningful, just is to be a being who 
extends beyond what we can know about ourselves. The project, 
then, is not to decide what to care about, but to discover what it 
is about which one already cares. (2011, pp. 215-216)
This last statement is one I find pertinent in the modern 
world, particularly for understanding identity in its essence. 
By finding one’s self delivered over to being, one is able to 
see two forms of belonging together. As discussed, one is 
ontological. In taking these technologies for granted, we 
often forget about how unique our relationship to others has 
become, in addition to how we initiate, maintain, and nourish 
our bonds with others through them (see Licoppe, 2004, for 
an overview of connected presence; see also Ling, 2008, for 
an insightful analysis of mobile rituals and how they relate to 
social cohesion). These inspired actions are indicative of an 
identity unique for today’s skilled mobile user, one where the 
self is generally understood by its ability to weave material 
and immaterial domains together, each populated with the 
presence of others. In being compelled to reach out to like-
minded others, particularly through electronic means that 
have, through recursive use, seemingly molded with the cor-
poreal body, one demonstrates the observable manifestation 
of being delivered over to being’s embrace, of belonging 
together with being in this particular epoch. The second form 
of belonging together concerns, of course, being together in 
the embrace of the digital Gemeinschaft (see Ling, 2012, p. 
191). Being together in the communal sense is something 
we, as Dasein, inherently care about.
If we are to understand identity, particularly in an era of 
widespread mobile social media, we must give consideration 
to how our fundamental mode of existence is not one where 
we stand over the self, examine it, and then assign it with 
properties. Before labeling one’s identity with ontic proper-
ties, one first must recognize how they are delivered over into 
a world where such claims can be made and make sense—
where they arise out of being-there. Through this sort of phe-
nomenological disclosure, we are better equipped to recognize 
how poiēsis, the term Aristotle used to describe creative pro-
duction/cultivation, is a constitutive feature of Dasein; it is 
the means by which we become absorbed into worlds that we 
ourselves nurture due to our identification with and invest-
ment in them. For the Greeks enduring confusion brought 
about by the referendum, this is yet another instance where 
we should carefully take note of the invitation we have 
received, an invitation to recognize how our purposive move-
ments simultaneously allow and reveal how we become 
involved with and invested in worlds, particularly those pop-
ulated with like-minded others. For such investment to shine 
most brightly, we must, in some fashion, remain attentive to 
the way our everyday taken-for-granted skillful practices per-
mit a poetic opening where our temporal identification with 
the world manifests with clarity. Such being delivered over 
unveils the way we, as Daseins, possess a unique ability to 
respond to manifestations in ways that matter to us, to sync 
ourselves with the world in a congruent unity, and to thus 
remember that we belong together with being.
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Notes
1. As a refresher, in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927/1962), 
Heidegger’s entire reconfiguration of human being as Dasein 
makes it explicit that the world matters to us by way of our 
absorption into the world.
2. See also Saker and Evans (2016), who propose that the loca-
tion-based app Foursquare functions as a form of technologi-
cal memory and digital preservation. In his article, Saker and 
Evans draw on interviews with app users to suggest that, in a 
rather Bergsonian way, the locative past has a tendency to per-
meate the present. More pertinent to this study, however, con-
cerns the users’ ability to share their previous check-ins with 
others and revisit them at a later date. The locative-inspired 
media sent via Syntagma Square can also be revisited by users 
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at a later date, as social media functions as a digital database 
or dossier. Despite the recent calls to abandon Heidegger (see 
Fuchs, 2015), Evans (2015) further validates Heidegger’s place 
in media studies by drawing upon the notion of affectedness, 
or mood (Stimmung), to position mobile media technologies 
as “things.” Such a combination allows us to better understand 
mobile media technologies as instruments that contribute to 
the gathering of existential locales.
3. While this piece does advocate for positioning identity as perfor-
mative, it takes a Heideggerian, phenomenological approach and, 
thus, sees performative identity as Dasein being appropriated by 
and with a world manifesting itself within Dasein’s own temporal 
horizon. In my view, this particular positioning of identity pro-
vides a unique way to further understand Goffman’s front stage/
back stage theatrical metaphor (see Goffman, 1959), in addition 
to how we pre-reflectively read and engage with environments.
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